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Paul Krugman 
The papers in this volume represent the latest stage in an ongoing research 
project that has occupied international economists around the world for more 
than a decade. The project is the reconstruction of international trade theory to 
take account of increasing returns and imperfect competition; it is a project 
that has increasingly focused on the problem of quantification, of making the 
models operational. 
In this introduction I will try to put the research reported in this volume in 
context. I begin with a brief review of  the origins of  the concept of  strategic 
trade policy, then turn to a summary of the results of earlier quantitative work, 
and finally summarize some of the key points raised in this volume. 
The Concept of Strategic Trade Policy 
The revolution that swept through the theory of international trade in the 
first half of the 1980s-the  rise of the so-called new trade theory’-left  many 
of the insights of traditional trade theory intact. In particular, introducing im- 
perfect competition and increasing returns into the picture does not alter the 
fundamental point that trade is a positive-sum game, generally carried on to 
countries’ mutual benefit. Indeed, the new  trade theory adds to the positive 
sum: by  enlarging markets,  international trade  increases competition and 
allows greater exploitation of  economies of  scale, both of  which represent 
gains over and above those due to comparative advantage. 
Paul Krugman is professor of  economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a 
research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
1. The “new trade theory” began with models that used the device of  monopolistic  competition 
to show how economies  of scale could be a source of trade and gains from trade, alongside  conven- 
tional  comparative advantage. Early papers include Lancaster (1980), Krugman (1979, 1981), 
Dixit and Norman (1980), Helpman (1981), and Ethier (1982); much of  the positive theory is 
summarized  in a common framework by Helpman and Krugman (1985). 
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Yet  the new trade theory also suggests some new reasons why government 
intervention in  international trade might prove beneficial. Traditional theory, 
of course, has long offered potential justifications for deviating from free trade. 
Large countries, able to affect their terms of trade, can benefit if they impose 
optimal tariffs (and other countries do not retaliate). Even small countries have 
a second-best  justification for tariffs on particular industries if domestic distor- 
tions lead to a divergence between private and social costs. In traditional the- 
ory, however, domestic distortions are in effect imposed on a basic model of 
undistorted competition; the second-best  justifications for activist trade policy, 
however plausible, always have the feel of footnotes to an approach in which 
free trade is optimal in the absence of specific reasons to the contrary. 
In  the new  trade theory, by  contrast, the “distortions” are woven  into the 
basic fabric of the trade models themselves. A theory of trade that is based at 
least in part on increasing returns must allow for oligopoly, external econo- 
mies, or both. Either necessarily implies a failure of  the usual conditions for 
optimality of  laissez-faire: if economies of  scale are internal to firms, there 
must be an oligopoly in which price exceeds marginal cost; if the economies 
of scale are somehow purely external to firms, and perfect competition is thus 
preserved, social marginal cost is less than private. The new trade theory sug- 
gests that in practice many traded goods are produced by  industries that are 
both oligopolistic and subject to external economies (e.g., because of econo- 
mies of scale in the production of nontraded intermediates). Thus instead of a 
picture of an international economy that is at a Pareto optimum, the new trade 
theory offers a picture of one in which markets normally lead to suboptimal re- 
sults. 
But simply saying that free trade is unlikely to be strictly optimal is not the 
same thing as saying that any particular deviation from laissez-faire is likely 
to improve matters. Can anything be said about the likely direction of the bias 
and the likely type of national policy that can improve on free trade? 
In the early 1980s James Brander and Barbara Spencer (1983, 1985)  created 
a considerable stir with an analysis of trade policy under imperfect competi- 
tion. The Brander-Spencer analysis did three things. First, it offered a particu- 
larly clever way of setting up the case for activist trade policy, one which sim- 
plified the issue enormously and thereby revealed its core. Second, it seemed 
to suggest that the new trade theory provided at least limited support for a 
kind of neo-mercantilism, for the assertion that governments could in fact raise 
national income at other countries’ expense by  supporting national firms in 
international competition. Third, and not  without importance, the Brander- 
Spencer approach could be succinctly described with a term that, while accu- 
rate, seemed to promise a larger prize than Brander and Spencer themselves 
ever suggested: “strategic trade policy.” 
What the Brander-Spencer approach actually consisted of was the follow- 
ing: we imagine two firms, from each of two countries, competing for some 
export market. Domestic consumers in this sector are ignored or assumed away, 3  Introduction 
so that the approach is inherently biased toward a view of trade as competition 
rather than  mutual gain. The firms compete by  choosing the  level of  some 
strategic variable: perhaps output, perhaps capacity, perhaps R&D. 
In this kind of competitive situation, firms would like to convince each other 
of their aggressiveness. That is, each would like the other to believe that it will 
invest or produce massively, thereby inducing the other to produce or invest 
less, perhaps even to avoid entering the market at all. The problem is to find a 
way  to make the threat of  aggressive competition credible. The answer sug- 
gested by industrial organization theorists is that firms will make “strategic” 
moves-that  is, take actions that do not directly raise profits, but that are in- 
tended to make aggressive behavior more credible and therefore have a deter- 
rent effect on potential rivals. The quintessential strategic move is construction 
of excess capacity, which a firm does not expect to use, but which it builds in 
order to deter entry of potential competitors. 
What Brander and Spencer pointed out was that trade policies could serve 
the same strategic purpose. Suppose that one of the two firms is backed by a 
government, which commits itself to subsidize the firm’s sales. Then the other 
firm will know  that an aggressive policy by the  subsidized firm is rational 
and will curtail its own plans. The result can be to raise the firm’s profits by 
much more than the actual subsidy outlay. And as a result, such a “strategic” 
trade policy can raise the aggressive nation’s income at the other country’s ex- 
pense. 
The Brander-Spencer analysis nicely cuts through the complexities.  But it 
is also subject to abuse: it has enabled advocates of aggressive trade policies 
to give their views a new intellectual gloss. Thus the theory of strategic trade 
policy has been subject to an unusually detailed academic critique, the upshot 
of  which  has been  to show that what  Brander and  Spencer offered was an 
example, not a general result. Eaton and Grossman (1986) showed that the case 
for strategic aggressiveness was sensitive to the assumed form of competition; 
Horstmann and Markusen (1986) showed that the benefits of  strategic trade 
policy might be dissipated by entry of new firms and the resulting excess ca- 
pacity;  Dixit  and  Grossman  (1986)  showed  that  competition  for  scarce 
resources among industries complicates greatly the task of devising a welfare- 
improving policy; and Dixit and Kyle (1985) argued that strategic trade poli- 
cies should be seen as part of a larger game in which it would often be better 
for governments to rule out their possibility. 
What this academic critique showed was not that the strategic trade policy 
concept was wrong, but that it was not necessarily right.  Or to put it more 
accurately, the case for strategic trade policies was not like the traditional case 
for free trade, which (in the old trade theory) could be made a priori without 
consideration of the specific details of industries. Strategic trade policies could 
be recommended, if at all, only on the basis of detailed quantitative knowledge 
of the relevant industries. So what the new trade theory gave rise to was not a 
prescription for policy, but a program of research. 4  Paul Krugman 
Efforts at Quantification 
It is not an easy task to arrive at quantitatively operational conclusions from 
models of imperfect competition. Indeed, to a considerable extent, the field of 
industrial organization seems to have given up on the task, in that the remark- 
able and fascinating body of industrial organization theory that has been devel- 
oped since 1970 has an equally remarkable lack of operational content or em- 
pirical confirmation. 
In international economics, however, such a state of affairs has been viewed 
as unacceptable by all concerned. Perhaps because free trade is such a power- 
ful symbol, perhaps because international economists are more likely than in- 
dustrial organization theorists to commute to Washington  or Brussels,  there 
was almost immediately a demand to put up or shut up: to determine when, if 
ever, the new arguments against free trade were relevant. 
But how was this to be done? Ideally one would estimate models of imper- 
fectly competitive industries econometrically. In practice this is extremely hard 
to do, because of the difficulty of identifying firm behavior. In fact, it is actu- 
ally very hard to estimate models even of perfectly competitive industries; add- 
ing the potential complexities of oligopoly is beyond what anyone has man- 
aged to do. 
In a seminal paper, however, Dixit (1988) offered a way to make some prog- 
ress. (Harris and Cox [  19841 independently developed a similar approach.) He 
suggested using a “calibration” technique similar to that used in computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) models. In this technique, parameter estimates are 
drawn  from  econometric  and  engineering  estimates  wherever  possible;  the 
number of  remaining parameters  of  the model is then narrowed  down by  a 
priori assumptions until the model can be fully identified by  requiring that it 
match data for some base period. Dixit used this technique to quantify a simple 
model of the U.S. auto industry. Once the model has been quantified, it then 
becomes possible to carry out policy experiments. It is also possible to carry 
out sensitivity analysis, to see whether the conclusions of these experiments 
are crucially dependent on the particular a priori assumptions made. 
In general, this technique is no worse when applied to the new trade theory 
than in conventional constant-returns models (e.g., Whalley  1985). In imper- 
fect competition, however, there is a special problem: the need to represent the 
behavior of firms. In the theoretical literature in trade (and for that matter in 
industrial organization) it is generally simply assumed that firms act noncoop- 
eratively, either as Bertrand price-setters or as Cournot quantity-setters. When 
one tries to calibrate a model, however, the data generally seem to be inconsis- 
tent with either assumption. Dixit’s answer to this problem was to represent 
firms’ behavior by the device of conjectural variations, leaving the conjectural 
variation parameter to be decided by the data. The problems with this method 
are, first, that the use of conjectural variations cannot be properly justified ana- 
lytically and, second, that there is no reason to expect the conjectural variations 
parameter to remain stable in the face of alternative policies. 5  Introduction 
This has not  stopped other authors from using the conjectural variations 
technique-Baldwin  and  Krugman (1988b), for example, is an early post- 
Dixit paper that complains about the approach but uses it nonetheless. In an- 
other key early paper, however, Venables and Smith (1 986) proposed an alter- 
native. They suggested that the modeler assume either Bertrand or Cournot 
behavior and reconcile this with the data by positing an unobserved elasticity 
of substitution between the products of different firms. This approach has the 
virtue of theoretical tightness; it has the defect that the data are not given the 
chance to tell us anything about the behavior of firms. 
By  1985, then, an approach had been developed that allowed quantification 
of imperfect-competition models of trade and industrial policy. It was by  no 
means an ideal method-most  papers in this area contain some kind of dis- 
claimer, an acknowledgment that the results should not  be  taken too seri- 
ously  -but  it at least allowed research to go beyond purely theoretical specula- 
tion. There is now a reasonably large selection of calibrated new trade models, 
including Dixit (1988), Baldwin and Krugman (1988a, 1988b), Smith and Ven- 
ables (1988), Venables and  Smith (1986), Baldwin and Ham (1989), and 
others. 
What do these models tell us? Three main points seem to have emerged. 
First, the models generally suggest that the positive economics of trade pol- 
icy-its  consequences  for output and trade flows-are  quite different from the 
predictions of conventional trade theory. In particular, protection, by encourag- 
ing entry of  domestic firms, often promotes exports. In  some cases, as in 
Baldwin and Krugman (1988b), this result alone is of  some importance for 
policy disputes. 
Second, the models have for the most part supported the view that mod- 
est  tariffs  and/or  subsidies, if  imposed  unilaterally, do  improve  on  free 
trade.  Dixit’s initial model  suggested that  tariff  rates  in  the  low  double- 
digit range were optimal; similar results have recurred in a number of other 
papers. 
Third, however, the calibrated models generally suggest quite large costs to 
trade war and, conversely, large gains from mutual removal of trade barriers. 
These pro-free-trade results have actually played a significant role in two key 
policy debates in recent years: Harris and Cox (1984) provided some valuable 
ammunition to  Canadian advocates of  free trade with  the  United  States, 
and Venables and Smith provided much of  the technical background to the 
Cecchini Report (Emerson et al. 1989) that stated the economic case for the 
completion of the European internal market in 1992. But these results are all 
very preliminary. It is clearly necessary to refine and extend empirical work in 
strategic trade. 
An Overview of the Volume 
The papers in this volume fall into three main groups: refinement of  the 
basic calibration technique, efforts to extend that technique to encompass in- 6  Paul Krugman 
dustry dynamics, and renewed efforts to replace some of  the ad hockery of 
calibration with actual testing of the implications of new trade models. 
Refining the Technique 
Krishna, Hogan, and Swage1 offer a paper very much in the Dixit mode 
but suggest that an alternative formulation of demand is more satisfactory. In 
implementing  this  formulation,  they  discover  something  disheartening- 
namely, that even the sign of optimal policies is sensitive to the prior assump- 
tions. They confirm, however, Dixit’s basic results that the gains from interven- 
tion are in any case small, and that the gains from trade policy are negligible 
if appropriate domestic policies are implemented. 
Venables and Smith, in their separate contributions to this volume, follow 
their own slightly different approach-in  Venables’s case by calibrating a basic 
model to a battery of industries, in Smith’s by a more in-depth look at European 
autos. The results here are more heartening  than in the Krishna et al. paper. 
Venables, in particular, notes that when the a priori assumptions about the form 
of competition are changed, the parameters fitted in calibration change as well; 
fortunately, they  do so in a way  that usually  makes the predicted results  of 
policies similar. So he finds that the typical result that modest tariffs or export 
subsidies can produce small gains is quite robust. Smith, too, finds some results 
that are robust to changes in the specification of the model, but other aspects 
of his results are quite sensitive to ad hoc assumptions. 
Finally, the paper by Norman and Strandenes is on a very different subject, 
that of competition and entry in a regulated service industry. It shows, however, 
that the basic issues of modeling remain much the same as they are in ordinary 
trade policy. 
Dynamics 
Klepper addresses the effects of trade policy in an industry that is often cited 
as a classic case for strategic trade policy, aircraft. As he points out, however, 
it is a far more complex industry than is often realized, due to the combined 
dynamic effects of heavy initial R&D and a steep learning curve. Perhaps as 
interesting as his results is the evidence his paper offers on the difficulty of 
adequately modeling even a seemingly straightforward duopoly. 
The paper by Harris represents a cleverly  innovative attack on a difficult 
problem: in this case, the role of trade policy in an industry in transition.  He 
models the U.S.  steel industry, with its declining large-scale producers and 
rising minimills, and shows that the U.S. protection of that industry looks very 
different in the dynamic context than it would in a static model. He also shows, 
interestingly, that while free trade would be better than the existing protection, 
a tightening of the current quotas would actually raise welfare. 
It has been argued by  some analysts-myself  included-that  the case for 
strategic policies is substantially stronger if these policies are implemented 
“upstream,” e.g., by subsidizing the supply of  specialized inputs like skilled 
manpower. Ulph and Winters use a calibrated approach to study such strategic 7  Introduction 
manpower policies; they suggest that such policies may indeed be powerful, 
but also that issues of international mobility of high-skill workers are surpris- 
ingly critical. 
Evidence 
In the final section of the book, Rodrik and Winters use unusual sources of 
evidence to test the importance of  new trade factors. Rodrik exploits one of 
the world economy’s natural experiments. Taiwan and South Korea are very 
similar economies by many measures. Their industrial organization, however, 
is spectacularly divergent. Rodrik argues that Korea’s highly concentrated in- 
dustry ought to be better at assuring customers of quality and finds evidence 
that this is in fact the case; in so doing, he indirectly confirms the importance 
of industrial organization in the process of international trade. 
Winters uses an even more exotic test. He argues that import surveillance- 
which puts foreign sellers on notice that they are being watched, but does not 
impose any current restriction on imports-should  not matter for a competitive 
industry. The fact that it does in fact appear to lead to a reduction in imports is 
indirect evidence that the typical industry is in fact composed of imperfectly 
competitive firms that engage in strategic behavior. 
Directions for Future Research 
What can we learn from the research represented in this volume? The empir- 
ical implementation of the new trade theory has not been an easy matter. In 
spite of the growing body of experience with such empirical work, each new 
application is a painful process: after hard work learning details of a particular 
industry, the researcher typically constructs a model that, while capturing some 
crucial aspects of reality, is less than fully satisfactory. There have been no 
stunning empirical successes. 
It is also true that the research generally provides little support for a drastic 
rethinking of trade policy. Nobody has yet provided  empirical evidence that 
would suggest large gains from protection or export subsidy. This is itself a 
useful result, but it does not excite as much attention as would a striking pro- 
interventionist result. 
Yet  research in this area will clearly go on. For one thing, it remains im- 
portant to understand  as well as we can the positive effects of trade policy- 
and while the style of modeling represented here may not represent the final 
word on the effects of trade policy in imperfectly competitive industries, it is 
surely a much better guide than treating the market for aircraft as if it were 
similar to the market for wheat. The experience with the debates over regional 
free trade agreements in North America and Europe has already shown that 
even crude models of this kind can enter where conventional trade models are 
unable to tread. As experience is gained with dynamic models, in particular, we 
can expect to see them play an increasingly large role in actual policy debate. 
It is also true that modeling efforts thus far have focused exclusively on one 8  Paul Krugman 
source of potential gains from activist policy: the divergence between price 
and marginal cost. At the time of writing, the cutting edge of theoretical specu- 
lation has now shifted to  divergences between private and social cost, with new 
models of the externalities that may lead to long-term growth, to divergences 
among national growth rates, and to industry localization. Such external econ- 
omies, arising from interactions in the markets for specialized labor and inter- 
mediate inputs, cry  out for quantification. Thus there will surely be future 
waves of  empirical work on international trade in the presence of imperfect 
markets, and this future work will draw heavily on  the style of modeling repre- 
sented in this volume. 
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